Entries Tagged "cooperation"
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I spend a lot of time in my book骗子和局外人关于合作与背叛。合作有利于团队，而牺牲了个人。Defecting is good for the individual at the expense of the group.Given that evolution concerns individuals,there has been a lot of controversy over how altruism might have evolved.
这是一个可能的答案: it's favored by chance:
关键的见解是，可以支持的总人口规模取决于合作者的比例：更多的合作意味着为所有人提供更多的食物和更大的人口。If,due to chance,there is a random increase in the number of cheats then there is not enough food to go around and total population size will decrease.Conversely,a random decrease in the number of cheats will allow the population to grow to a larger size,不成比例地惠及合作者。这样的话，the cooperators are favoured by chance,而且从长远来看更有可能获胜。
Dr George Constable,soon to join the University of Bath from Princeton,uses the analogy of flipping a coin,头赢20英镑，尾巴输10英镑：
"Although the odds [of] winning or losing are the same,winning is more good than losing is bad.Random fluctuations in cheat numbers are exploited by the cooperators,who benefit more than they lose out."
EDITED TO ADD (8/12): Journalarticle.
This is aninteresting paper-- the full version is behind a paywall -- about how we as humans can motivate people to cooperate with future generations.
摘要：今天对可再生资源的过度开发对后代的福利有着很高的成本。Unlike in other public goods games,然而，future generations cannot reciprocate actions made today.What mechanisms can maintain cooperation with the future?To answer this question,we devise a new experimental paradigm,the 'Intergenerational Goods Game'.一系列连续的组（代）都可以提取资源以耗尽资源，或者为下一个组留下一些东西。Exhausting the resource maximizes the payoff for the present generation,but leaves all future generations empty-handed.Here we show that the resource is almost always destroyed if extraction decisions are made individually.这种与未来合作的失败主要是由少数人推动的，他们提取的远远超过可持续的。相反，当采掘活动由投票民主决定时，资源是持续的。投票有效有两个原因。First,它允许大多数合作者限制叛逃者。Second,it reassures conditional cooperators that their efforts are not futile.Voting,然而，只有当可持续发展对所有参与方具有约束力时，才能促进可持续发展。Our results have implications for policy interventions designed to sustain intergenerational public goods.
我说过核电站安全系统，both在这里and inBeyond Fear.Specifically,I've talked about tobacco plants that call air strikes against insects that eat them,by releasing a scent that attracts predators to those insects.这是另一个防御措施：植物也通过feeding them a sweet snack（整集在这里) that makes them give off a strong scent.
我以前没听说过这个词，but it's an interesting one.以下摘录来自采访with Rebecca Solnit,author ofA Paradise Built in Hell: The Extraordinary Communities That Arise in Disaster:
术语“精英恐慌”was coined by Caron Chess and Lee Clarke of Rutgers.从20世纪50年代开始到现在，the major sociologists of disaster -- Charles Fritz,Enrico Quarantelli，Kathleen Tierney,and Lee Clarke -- proceeding in the most cautious,有条不紊，很明显，他们试图成为社会科学家政治中立的方式，通过他们对人性的巨大自信和对制度权威的深刻批判，他们得出了这一结论。这是相当了不起的。
Elites tend to believe in a venal,selfish,and essentially monstrous version of human nature,我有时认为这是他们自己的人性。I mean,people don't become incredibly wealthy and powerful by being angelic,necessarily.他们相信只有他们的力量才能让我们保持一致，当它以某种方式缩小时，我们沸腾的暴力将浮出水面——那是非常卡特里娜清楚。蒂莫西·加顿·阿什、莫林·多德和其他所有这些人立即加入了潮流，并开始根据卡特里娜飓风期间发生大规模暴力的传言是真实的假设撰写评论。很多人都不知道谣言被驱散了，那些事情实际上并没有发生；真是悲剧。
But there's also an elite fear -- going back to the 19th century -- that there will be urban insurrection.It's a valid fear.I see these moments of crisis as moments of popular power and positive social change.The major example in my book is Mexico City,where the '85 earthquake prompted public disaffection with the one-party system and,therefore,the rebirth of civil society.
In骗子和局外人,我经常谈论社会规范，以及人们何时遵守这些规范。这项研究uses survival data from shipwrecks to measure it.
The authors argue that shipwrecks can actually tell us a fair bit about human behavior,since everyone stuck on a sinking ship has to do a bit of cost-benefit analysis.在社会规范和at least in case of theTitanic,direct orders from authority figures.这种成本效益逻辑在人类行为的经济模型中是基本的。作者写道，这表明沉船可以提供一个来自控制实验的想法的真实世界的测试。
Eight ideas,to be precise.这就是作者提出的假设，ranging from "women have a survival advantage in shipwrecks"“女性更有可能在英国船只上生存，given the UK's strong sense of gentility."They tested them using a database of ship sinkings that encompasses over 15,000 passengers and crew,and provides information on everything from age and sex to whether the passenger had a first-class ticket.
For the most part,提供的经验教训Titanic只是不要坚持。除上述两种灾害外，crew members had a survival rate of over 60 percent,远远高于其他分析组。（尽管他们没有一直很好地生存——在大约一半的残骸中，机组人员和乘客之间没有统计差异）。与其跟船一起下去，captains ended up coming in second,with just under half surviving.作者提出了一些合理的船员生存原因，including better fitness,对沉船的全面了解，以及如何处理紧急情况的更好培训。无论如何，然而，他们不清楚也不总是为了救乘客而牺牲自己。
在光谱的另一端，nearly half the children on theTitanicsurvived,但其余失事船只的数据下降了近15%。About a quarter of women survived other sinkings,but roughly three times that made it through theTitanic活着。如果您排除Titanic,女性存活率为18%。or about half the rate at which males came through alive.
What about social factors?上尉命令“妇女和儿童优先”确实促进了女性的生存，但只有10个百分点。Most of the other ideas didn't pan out.For example,the speed of sinking,这可能会给机组人员更多的时间先让易受伤害的乘客下车，made no difference whatsoever to female survival.Neither did the length of voyage,which might give passengers more time to get to know both the boat and each other.女性乘客的比例似乎也没有什么不同。
纸类在这里(behind a paywall):
摘要: Since the sinking of the Titanic,there has been a widespread belief that the social norm of "women and children first"(WCF) give women a survival advantage over men in maritime disasters,船长和机组人员把乘客放在首位。我们分析了一个横跨三个世纪的18个海洋灾害数据库，涵盖30多个民族15000多人的命运。Our results provide a unique picture of maritime disasters.与男性相比，女性有明显的生存劣势。船长和船员的生存率明显高于乘客。We also find that: the captain has the power to enforce normative behavior;there seems to be no association between duration of a disaster and the impact of social norms;women fare no better when they constitute a small share of the ship's complement;灾前航程的长短似乎对妇女的相对生存率没有影响；自第一次世界大战以来，生存率的性别差距已经缩小；and women have a larger disadvantage in British shipwrecks.Taken together,our findings show that human behavior in life-and-death situations is best captured by the expression "every man for himself."
I write a lot about altruism,fairness,and cooperation in my new book (out in February!),和这类事情我很感兴趣：
In a新研究,researchers had 15-month old babies watch movies of a person distributing crackers or milk to two others,either evenly or unevenly.Babies look at things longer when they're surprised,so measuring looking time can be used to gain insight into what babies expect to happen.In the study,当视频中的人不均匀地分发食物时，婴儿看起来更长，暗示惊喜，and perhaps even an early perception of fairness.
但该团队也表示，他们在公平与利他主义之间建立了联系。在实验的第二部分，the babies chose between two toys,and were then asked to share one of the toys with an experimenter.About a third of the babies were "selfish sharers": they shared the toy they hadn't chosen.Another third were "altruistic sharers": they shared their chosen toy.(The rest chose not to share.他们可能被实验者的不熟悉所抑制，or maybe they just weren't that into sharing.)
研究的后半部分有趣的是，总的来说，之前对不公平的饼干和牛奶分配感到惊讶的婴儿倾向于与实验者（利他分享者）分享他们喜欢的玩具。The babies who shared the rejected toy hadn't expressed much surprise over unequal distribution.这使得研究人员认为利他主义和公平感之间存在着根本的联系。
Both psychology and neuroscience have a lot to say about these topics,and the resulting debate reads like a subset of the "Is there such a thing as free will?"辩论。我认为那些相信没有自由意志的人错误定义术语.
What does this have to do with security?一切。直到我们了解人类的公平和利他主义的自然倾向，我们才能真正了解利用这些倾向的人，and build systems to prevent them from taking advantage.
New paper: Dengpan Liu,永华记，and Vijay Mookerjee (2011),"Knowledge Sharing and Investment Decisions in Information Security,"决策支持系统，in press.
Abstract:We study the relationship between decisions made by two similar firms pertaining to knowledge sharing and investment in information security.The analysis shows that the nature of information assets possessed by the two firms,either complementary or substitutable,在影响这些决策方面起着至关重要的作用。在互补的情况下，研究表明，企业具有共享安全知识的自然动机，不需要外部影响来诱导共享。However,the investment levels chosen in equilibrium are lower than optimal,an aberration that can be corrected using coordination mechanisms that reward the firms for increasing their investment levels.In the substitutable case,这些公司陷入了囚徒困境的陷阱，他们不在均衡中分享安全知识，despite the fact that it is beneficial for both of them to do so.Here,the beneficial role of a social planner to encourage the firms to share is indicated.However,even when the firms share in accordance to the recommendations of a social planner,the level of investment chosen by the firms is sub-optimal.这些公司要么进入“军备竞赛”where they over-invest or reenact the under-investment behavior found in the complementary case.Once again,this sub-optimal behavior can be corrected using incentive mechanisms that penalize for over-investment and reward for increasing the investment level in regions of under-investment.The proposed coordination schemes,with some modifications,即使在企业规避风险的情况下，也能实现社会最优的结果。Implications for information security vendors,firms,and social planner are discussed.
Three months ago,I宣布that I was writing a book on why security exists in human societies.This is basically the book's thesis statement:
All complex systems contain parasites.In any system of cooperative behavior,一个不合作的策略将是有效的——而且系统将容忍不合作的人——只要他们不是太多或太有效。因此，as a species evolves cooperative behavior,它也演变成一个利用诚实多数的不诚实少数人。If individuals within a species have the ability to switch strategies,the dishonest minority will never be reduced to zero.因此，物种同时进化出两件事：1）保护自己免受这一不诚实少数群体的伤害的安全系统，2）欺骗系统成功寄生。
Humans evolved along this path.基本机制可以简单地建模。It is in our collective group interest for everyone to cooperate.不合作符合任何个人的短期利益：缺陷，in game theory terms.但如果每个人都有缺陷，society falls apart.To ensure widespread cooperation and minimal defection,我们共同实施各种社会安全系统。
其中两个系统在史前进化：道德和声誉。Two others evolved as our social groups became larger and more formal: laws and technical security systems.这些安全系统所做的，effectively,is give individuals incentives to act in the group interest.但这些系统都没有，with the possible exception of some fanciful science-fiction technologies,能让那些不诚实的少数人降到零。
In complex modern societies,many complications intrude on this simple model of societal security.Decisions to cooperate or defect are often made by groups of people -- governments,公司，and so on -- and there are important differences because of dynamics inside and outside the groups.我们的大部分社会安全都委托给了警察，for example -- and becomes institutionalized;这方面的动态性也很重要。Power struggles over who controls the mechanisms of societal security are inherent: "group interest"rapidly devolves to "the king's interest."社会安全可以成为当权者继续掌权的工具，“诚实多数”的定义仅仅是遵守规则的人。
“不诚实的少数人”一词is not a moral judgment;it simply describes the minority who does not follow societal norm.因为许多社会规范实际上是不道德的，sometimes the dishonest minority serves as a catalyst for social change.Societies without a reservoir of people who don't follow the rules lack an important mechanism for societal evolution.Vibrant societies need a dishonest minority;if society makes its dishonest minority too small,it stifles dissent as well as common crime.
At this point,I have most of a first draft: 75,000 words.暂定名称仍然是“不诚实的少数群体：安全及其在现代社会中的作用”。I have signed a contract with Wiley to deliver a final manuscript in November for February 2012 publication.写一本书对我来说是一个探索的过程，最后一本书肯定会和我上面写的有些不同，甚至可能非常不同。But that's where I am today.
一个群体在应对外部冲突时经历社会团结是标准社会学理论。This paperstudies the phenomenon in the United States after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
Conflict produces group solidarity in four phases: (1) an initial few days of shock and idiosyncratic individual reactions to attack;（二）建立团结标志标准化展示一至二周；（三）高团结高原二至三个月；and (4) gradual decline toward normalcy in six to nine months.Solidarity is not uniform but is clustered in local groups supporting each other's symbolic behavior.Actual solidarity behaviors are performed by minorities of the population,然而，大多数人对表现的模糊口头要求。纪念仪式断断续续地重振情感高峰；participants become ranked according to their closeness to a center of ritual attention.事件，places,各组织声称其重要性在于将自己与国家团结仪式联系起来，尤其是将自己与实际无效的安全仪式联系起来。由于进入仪式关注中心而产生冲突；实用主义者嘲笑安全和安全狂热者试图保持情绪强度的水平之间会发生冲突。The solidarity plateau is also a hysteria zone;as a center of emotional attention,it attracts ancillary attacks unrelated to the original terrorists as well as alarms and hoaxes.In particular historical circumstances,it becomes a period of atrocities.
作为一个群体生存机制，这当然是有意义的：面对群体的威胁，自利让位给群体利益。It's the kind of thing I am talking about in my新书.
Paper also available在这里.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.